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HUMAN ERROR AND GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS:
A COMPREHENSIVE, FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS USING HFACS

INTRODUCTION
Unsafe Acts of Operators
In general, the unsafe acts of operators (in the case of
aviation, the aircrew) can be loosely classified as either
errors or violations (Reason, 1990). Errors represent the
mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to
achieve their intended outcome. Not surprising, given
the fact that human beings, by their very nature, make
errors, these unsafe acts dominate most accident databases.
Violations, on the other hand, are much less common and
refer to the willful disregard for the rules and regulations
that govern the safety of flight.

It is generally accepted that like most accidents, those
in aviation do not happen in isolation. Rather, they are
the result of a chain of events often culminating with the
unsafe acts of aircrew. Indeed, from Heinrich’s (Heinrich,
Peterson, & Roos, 1931) axioms of industrial safety, to
Bird’s (1974) “Domino theory” and Reason’s (1990)
“Swiss cheese” model of human error, a sequential theory
of accident causation has been consistently embraced by
most in the field of human error (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001c). Particularly useful in this regard has been Reason’s
(1990) description of active and latent failures within the
context of his “Swiss cheese” model of human error.
In his model, Reason describes four levels of human
failure, each one influencing the next. To hear Reason
and others describe it, organizational influences often
lead to instances of unsafe supervision which in turn lead
to preconditions for unsafe acts and ultimately the unsafe
acts of operators. It is at this latter level, the unsafe acts of
operators, that most accident investigations are focused
upon.
Unfortunately, while Reason’s seminal work forever
changed the way aviation and other accident investigators view human error, it was largely theoretical and did
not provide the level of detail necessary to apply it in
the real world. It wasn’t until Shappell and Wiegmann
(2000, 2001) developed a comprehensive human error
framework — the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) — that Reason’s ideas were
folded into the applied setting.

Errors
Within HFACS, the category of errors was expanded
to include three basic error types (decision, skill-based,
and perceptual errors).
Decision Errors. Decision-making and decision errors
have been studied, debated, and reported extensively in
the literature. In general, however, decision errors can be
grouped into one of three categories: procedural errors,
poor choices, and problem-solving errors. Procedural
decision errors (Orasanu, 1993) or rule-based mistakes,
as referred to by Rasmussen (1982), occur during highly
structured tasks of the sorts, if X, then do Y. Aviation
is highly structured, and consequently, much of pilot
decision-making is procedural. That is, there are very
explicit procedures to be performed at virtually all phases
of flight. Unfortunately, these procedures are occasionally
misapplied or inappropriate for the circumstances, often
culminating in an accident.
However, even in aviation, not all situations have
corresponding procedures to manage them. Therefore,
many situations require that a choice be made among
multiple response options. This is particularly true
when insufficient experience, time, or other outside
pressures may preclude a correct decision. Put simply,
sometimes we chose well, and sometimes we do not.
The resultant choice decision errors (Orasanu, 1993) or
knowledge-based mistakes (Rasmussen, 1982) have been
of particular interest to aviation psychologists over the
last several decades.

HFACS
The entire HFACS framework includes a total of 19
causal categories within Reason’s (1990) four levels of
human failure (Figure 1). While in many ways, all of
the causal categories are equally important; particularly
germane to any examination of GA accident data are the
unsafe acts of aircrew. For that reason, we have elected
to restrict this analysis to only those causal categories associated with the unsafe acts of GA aircrew. A complete
description of all 19 HFACS causal categories is available
elsewhere (i.e., Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
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Figure 1. The HFACS framework

techniques are as much an overt expression of one’s personality as they are a factor of innate ability and aptitude.
More important, however, these techniques can interfere
with the safety of flight or may exacerbate seemingly
minor flying emergencies.
Perceptual Errors. While decision and skill-based errors
have dominated most accident databases and have therefore been included in most error frameworks, perceptual
errors have received comparatively less attention. No less
important, perceptual errors occur when sensory input is
degraded or “unusual,” as is often the case when flying at
night, in the weather, or in other visually impoverished
conditions. Faced with acting on inadequate information,
aircrew run the risk of misjudging distances, altitude,
and descent rates, as well as responding incorrectly to a
variety of visual/vestibular illusions.
It is important to note, however, that it is not the illusion or disorientation that is classified as a perceptual
error. Rather, it is the pilot’s erroneous response to the illusion or disorientation that is captured here. For example,
many pilots have experienced spatial disorientation when
flying in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
In instances such as these, pilots are taught to rely on
their primary instruments, rather than their senses when
controlling the aircraft. Still, some pilots fail to monitor
their instruments when flying in adverse weather or at

Finally, there are instances when a problem is not well
understood, and formal procedures and response options are not available. In effect, aircrew find themselves
where they have not been before and textbook answers
are nowhere to be found. It is during these times that the
invention of a novel solution is required. Unfortunately,
individuals in these situations must resort to slow and effortful reasoning processes – a luxury rarely afforded in an
aviation emergency – particularly in general aviation.
Skill-based Errors. Skill-based behavior within the
context of aviation is best described as “stick-and-rudder”
and other basic flight skills that occur without significant
conscious thought. As a result, these skill-based actions
are particularly vulnerable to failures of attention and/or
memory. In fact, attention failures have been linked to
many skill-based errors such as the breakdown in visual
scan patterns, inadvertent activation of controls, and the
misordering of steps in procedures. Likewise, memory
failures such as omitted items in a checklist, place losing, or forgotten intentions have adversely impacted the
unsuspecting aircrew.
Equally compelling, yet not always considered by
investigators, is the manner or technique one uses when
flying an aircraft. Regardless of one’s training, experience,
and educational background, pilots vary greatly in the
way in which they control their aircraft. Arguably, such
2

PURPOSE

night, choosing instead to fly using fallible cues from their
senses. Tragically, many of these aircrew and others who
have been fooled by visual/vestibular illusions have wound
up on the wrong end of the accident investigation.

The HFACS framework was originally developed for
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps as an accident investigation and data analysis tool (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000;
2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Since its development, other organizations such as the FAA have explored
the use of HFACS as a complement to preexisting systems
within civil aviation in an attempt to capitalize on gains
realized by the military. These initial attempts, performed
at both the University of Illinois and the Civil Aerospace
Medical Institute (CAMI) have been highly successful and
have shown that HFACS can be reliably and effectively
used to analyze the underlying human causes of both
commercial and general aviation accidents (Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2003). Furthermore, these analyses have
helped identify general trends in the types of human
factors issues and aircrew errors that have contributed to
civil aviation accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003;
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a; 2001b).
Indeed, the FAA’s General Aviation & Commercial
Division (AFS-800) within the Flight Standards Service
and the Small Airplane Directorate (ACE-100) have acknowledged the added value and insights gleaned from
these HFACS analyses. Likewise, HFACS was cited by
the Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Joint Safety
Analysis Team (JSAT) and the General Aviation Data
Improvement Team (GADIT) as being particularly useful
in identifying the human error component of aviation
accidents.
To date, however, these initial analyses using HFACS
have only been performed on a limited set of accident
data within the context of civil aviation. Furthermore,
these analyses have generally been performed at a global
level, leaving several questions unanswered concerning
the underlying nature and prevalence of different error
types. As a result, AFS-800, ACE-100, the ADM JSAT,
and the GADIT committees have directly requested
that additional analyses be conducted to answer specific
questions about the exact nature of the human errors
identified, particularly within the context of GA. Those
specific questions include:

Violations
By definition, errors occur while aircrews are behaving within the rules and regulations implemented by an
organization. In contrast, violations represent the willful
disregard for the rules and regulations that govern safe
flight and, fortunately, occur much less frequently.
Routine Violations. While there are many ways to distinguish between types of violations, two distinct forms
have been identified, based on their etiology. The first,
routine violations, tend to be habitual by nature and
are often tolerated by the governing authority (Reason,
1990). Consider, for example, the individual who drives
consistently 5-10 mph faster than allowed by law or
someone who routinely flies in marginal weather when
authorized for visual meteorological conditions (VMC)
only. While both certainly violate governing regulations,
many drivers or pilots do the same thing. Furthermore,
people who drive 64 mph in a 55-mph zone almost always drive 64 in a 55-mph zone. That is, they routinely
violate the speed limit.
Often referred to as “bending the rules,” these violations
are often tolerated and, in effect, sanctioned by authority
(i.e., you’re not likely to get a traffic citation until you
exceed the posted speed limit by more than 10 mph).
If, however, local authorities started handing out traffic
citations for exceeding the speed limit on the highway
by 9 mph or less, then it is less likely that individuals
would violate the rules. By definition then, if a routine
violation is identified, investigators must look further up
the causal chain to identify those individuals in authority
who are not enforcing the rules.
Exceptional Violations. In contrast, exceptional violations appear as isolated departures from authority, not
necessarily characteristic of an individual’s behavior or
condoned by management (Reason, 1990). For example,
an isolated instance of driving 105 mph in a 55 mph
zone is considered an exceptional violation. Likewise,
flying under a bridge or engaging in other particularly
dangerous and prohibited maneuvers would constitute
an exceptional violation. However, it is important to note
that, while most exceptional violations are indefensible,
they are not considered exceptional because of their
extreme nature. Rather, they are considered exceptional
because they are neither typical of the individual nor
condoned by authority. Unfortunately, the unexpected
nature of exceptional violations makes them particularly
difficult to predict and problematic for organizations
to manage.

Question 1: Which unsafe acts are associated with the
largest percentage of accidents across the entire decade of
the 1990s (the 11 years from 1990 through 2000)? The
answer to this question will provide insight into the
types of human errors associated with GA accidents
from a global perspective.
Question 2: Has the percentage of accidents associated
with each unsafe act changed over the years? This question addresses whether any interventions implemented
over the past 11 years have been successful in reducing
3

we should focus our safety programs on? A more finegrained analysis of the specific types of errors within
each unsafe act causal category will be conducted to
answer this question.
Question 9: Do the types of errors committed within
each error category differ across accident severity? Like
questions 3 and 7, the answer to this question could
indicate which specific type of error within each category poses the greatest threat to safety.
Question 10: Do the types of errors committed within each
error category differ between seminal vs. non-seminal unsafe
acts? This question addresses whether there are differences
in the specific types of errors within each category that
are more likely to initiate the sequence of events. After
all, a given causal factor may be the most frequently cited
error form but may not be the most frequently cited
initiating event. If the goal is to intervene before the
accident chain of events is set in motion, this question
will determine where to focus safety resources.
Ultimately, answers to these questions will provide
us with an unprecedented glimpse into the face of human error within general aviation. The results of these
analyses can then be used to map intervention strategies
onto different error categories, enabling safety professionals to determine plausible prevention programs for
reducing GA accidents. Essentially, this project represents
the next step in the development of a larger civil aviation safety program whose ultimate goal is to reduce the
aviation accident rate through systematic, data-driven
intervention strategies and the objective evaluation of
intervention programs.

accidents caused by specific types of human error. It
also provides information as to whether any particular
error form has been increasing in occurrence and would
therefore pose serious safety concerns in the future, if
not addressed today.
Question 3: Does the pattern of unsafe acts differ across
fatal and non-fatal accidents? Previous research in other
aviation venues (e.g., military aviation) has shown that
violations of the rules tend to be associated with a larger
portion of fatal accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann,
1995, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1995). Will this
same pattern exist in GA accidents, or will other errors
more readily distinguish fatal from non-fatal accidents?
This question also directly addresses Objective 2 of
the FAA Flight Plan that states, “Reduce the number
of fatal accidents in general aviation.”
Question 4: Do the patterns of unsafe acts for fatal and
non-fatal accidents differ across years? Similar to question
two, this question addresses any increasing or decreasing
trends in the specific types of errors across the years,
particular as they relate to accident severity.
Question 5: How often is each error type the “primary”
or seminal cause of an accident? Answers to the previous
questions will highlight how often a particular error
type is associated with GA accidents. What they do
not answer is how often each type of error (e.g., skillbased) is the “initiating” error or simply the “consequence” of another error form (e.g., decision errors).
To answer this question, we will examine the seminal
unsafe act associated with each accident. Seminal events
in this study were defined as the first human error
cited within the sequence of events in an accident.
Ultimately, information regarding seminal errors will
help safety managers within the FAA to refine and/or
target intervention strategies so that they can have a
greater impact on GA safety.
Question 6: Do seminal unsafe acts differ across years?
Similar to questions 2 and 4, answers to this question
will provide insight into potential trends that will affect efforts aimed at reducing accidents and incidents
among GA.
Question 7: Do seminal unsafe acts differ as a function
of accident severity (fatal vs. non-fatal)? Like question
3, an answer to this question could indicate which
seminal errors are most important for preventing fatal
aviation accidents.
Question 8: What are the exact types of errors committed
within each error category? Just knowing that certain
types of errors (e.g., skill-based errors) are of major
concern typically does not provide enough detail to
do anything about it. What we would like to know,
for example, is exactly what are the skill-based errors

METHOD
Data
General aviation accident data from calendar years
1990-2000 were obtained from databases maintained by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and
the FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center (NASDAC). For analysis purposes, we selected only
accident reports that were classified “final” at the time
this report was written. The NTSB reports two levels of
investigation: factual and final. The factual investigation
is a preliminary report that only includes demographic
information associated with the accident such as the
location of the accident and severity of injuries but no
causal factors. Only the final report that contains the
causal factors associated with the accident was of interest
in this study.
We further eliminated from consideration those accidents that were classified as having “undetermined
causes,” and those that were attributed to sabotage,
4

Human Factors Quality Assurance
The data used in this study were drawn from NTSB
investigation reports that are often highly technical in
nature, requiring a fundamental understanding of specific terms, flight conditions, and the overall domain of
aviation to be effectively classified and coded. As aviation
SMEs, the pilot-coders were able to clearly understand
each component of the investigation reports studied.
What’s more, the pilot-coders represent the end users of
improved error analysis methods for conducting accident
investigations (i.e., aviation experts typically investigate
aviation accidents). Therefore, they were considered the
appropriate personnel for conducting the overall HFACS
analysis of the GA accident reports.
General aviation pilots, however, are not SMEs in the
domains of psychology or human factors, and therefore,
they may not fully understand the theoretical underpinnings associated with the various error types within the
HFACS framework. Hence, pilots might classify human
error data somewhat differently than SMEs in human
factors. Still, pilots in this study were trained on HFACS,
which did give them some level of expertise when assessing
human error. In fact, an earlier study addressed this issue
by comparing the coded database of a commercial pilot
rater to that of a psychologist and found the data to be
reliable (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a; 2001b).
Nonetheless, to be doubly sure that the pilot coders
had grasped the psychological aspects underlying human
error and HFACS, three additional SMEs with expertise
in human factors/aviation psychology examined each
HFACS classification that the pilot SMEs had assigned
to a given human cause factor. Essentially, the human
factors SMEs were ensuring that the pilots understood
the error analysis process and did not code causal factors
like spatial disorientation as a decision error, or exhibit
any other such blatant misunderstandings of the HFACS
model. To aid in the process, descriptive statistics were
used to identify outliers in the data, after which the corresponding NTSB report was obtained. The reports were
then independently reviewed by a minimum of two human factors SMEs for agreement with the previous codes.
After the human factors SMEs came to a consensus, the
codes were either changed in the database or left as the
pilot SMEs originally coded them. In the end, less than
4% of all causal factors were modified during the human
factors quality assurance process.

suicide, or criminal activity (e.g., stolen aircraft). When
the data were parsed in this manner, we were left with
only those GA “accidents” for which causal factors had
been “determined” and released by the NTSB.
The data were culled further to include only those accidents that involved powered GA aircraft (i.e., airplanes,
helicopters, and gyrocopters), thereby excluding blimps,
balloons, gliders, and ultra-light aircraft from the analysis.
Although the latter is arguably a powered aircraft, ultralights were considered sufficiently different from other
powered aircraft to warrant exclusion. Finally, since we
were interested in aircrew error, we excluded accidents
in which no aircrew-related unsafe act was considered
causal or contributory to the accident. In the end, 14,436
accidents involving over 25,000 aircrew causal factors
were included and submitted to further analyses using
the HFACS framework.
Causal Factor Classification Using HFACS
Seven GA pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma
City area as subject matter experts (SMEs). All were certified flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000 flight
hours in GA aircraft at the time they were recruited.
Each pilot was provided roughly 16 hours of training on the HFACS framework, which included didactic
lecture and practice (with feedback) applying the HFACS
framework to accident reports. After training, the seven
GA pilot-raters were randomly assigned accidents, so
at least two separate pilot-raters analyzed each accident
independently.
Using narrative and tabular data obtained from both
the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters were
instructed to classify each human causal factor identified by
the NTSB using the HFACS framework. Note, however,
that only those causal and contributory factors identified
by the NTSB were classified. That is, the pilot-raters were
instructed not to introduce additional casual factors that
were not identified by the original investigation. To do
so would be presumptuous and only infuse additional
opinion, conjecture, and guesswork into the analysis.
After our pilot-raters made their initial classifications
of the human causal factors (i.e., skill-based error, decision-error, etc.), the two independent ratings were compared. Where disagreements existed, the corresponding
pilot-raters were called into the laboratory to reconcile
their differences, and the consensus classification was
included in the database for further analysis. Overall,
pilot-raters agreed on the classification of causal factors
within the HFACS framework more than 85% of the
time, an excellent level of agreement considering that
this was, in effect, a decision-making task.
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total 100%. Additionally, each accident may be associated
with multiple instances of the same type of unsafe act.
However, as stated previously, the findings presented here
are for those accidents that involve at least one instance
of a particular unsafe act category.

RESULTS
The results of this research project will be presented
in a manner that addresses each of the specific questions
raised earlier. Each section will begin by restating the
question of interest, followed by a description of the
findings pertaining to it.
Question 1: Which unsafe acts are associated with the
largest percentage of accidents?
The GA data were initially examined to determine the
extent to which each HFACS causal category contributed
to GA accidents overall. To accomplish this, the frequency
and percentages of GA accidents associated with each
HFACS causal category were calculated. However, to
avoid over-representation by any single accident, each
causal category was counted a maximum of one time
per accident. For example, regardless of whether a given
accident was associated with one or more skill-based error, the presence of a skill-based error for that accident
was only counted once. In this way, the count acted as
an indicator of the presence or absence of a particular
HFACS causal category for a given accident.
The data were calculated in this manner with the
knowledge that most aviation accidents are associated
with multiple causal factors, including, on occasion,
multiple instances of the same HFACS causal category.
However, only by analyzing the data in this way could a
true representation of the percentage of accidents associated with each causal category be obtained.
The number and percentage of accidents associated
with at least one instance of a particular HFACS causal
category can be found in Figure 2, with one notable
exception – routine and exceptional violations. As with
post-hoc data examined in other venues (e.g., the U.S.
Navy/Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, etc.) it
proved too difficult to differentiate between routine and
exceptional violations using narrative data obtained from
the NTSB and NASDAC. As a result, the pilot-raters were
instructed to use the parent causal category of “violations,”
rather than distinguish between the two types.
The overall analysis of GA accidents revealed a picture
of human error within GA that was not possible before
the development of HFACS (Figure 2). Specifically, the
data indicate that skill-based errors were associated with
the largest portion of GA accidents (79.2% of the 14,436
GA accidents), followed by decision errors (29.7%),
violations (13.7%), and perceptual errors (5.7%). Note
that many of the accidents were associated with multiple
HFACS causal categories. In other words, an accident
could have been associated with a skill-based error, decision error, perceptual error, and violation, or any other
combination. Therefore, percentages of accidents do not

Question 2: Has the percentage of accidents associated
with each unsafe act changed over the years?
Analysis of the data on a year-by-year basis reveals that
the proportion of accidents associated with at least one
instance of each unsafe act category remained relatively
unchanged over the 11-year period examined in this study
(Figure 3). This would seem to suggest that safety efforts
directed at GA over the last several years have had little
effect on any specific type of human error. If anything,
there may have been a general, across-the-board effect,
although this seems unlikely, given the safety initiatives
employed. The only exceptions seemed to be a small dip in
the percentage of accidents associated with decision errors
in 1994, a gradual decline in violations observed from
1991 to 1994, and then again from 1995 to 2000. With
decision errors, however, the trend quickly re-established
itself at levels consistent with the overall average.
Question 3: Does the pattern of unsafe acts differ across
fatal and non-fatal accidents?
Figure 4 presents the percentage of fatal (n = 3,256)
and non-fatal (n = 11,180) accidents associated with each
type of unsafe act. From the graph in Figure 4, some important observations can be made. For instance, it may
surprise some that skill-based errors, not decision errors,
were the number-one type of human error associated with
fatal GA accidents. In fact, fatal accidents associated with
skill-based errors (averaging roughly 80.6% across the
years of the study) more than doubled the percentage
of accidents seen with decision errors (29.5%) and the
willful violation of the rules (30.5%). Even perceptual
errors, the focus of a great deal of interest over the years,
were associated with less than 4% of all fatal accidents.
In fact, the proportion of accidents associated with skillbased errors was greater than the three other error types
combined.
Upon closer examination, it appears that the percentage
of fatal and non-fatal accidents with skill-based, decision,
and perceptual errors, was relatively equal (Figure 4).
However, as expected, the proportion of accidents associated with violations was considerably higher for fatal than
non-fatal accidents. In fact, using a common estimate of
risk (known as the odds ratio), fatal accidents were more
than four times more likely to be associated with violations than non-fatal accidents (odds ratio = 4.547; 95%
confidence interval = 4.11 to 5.021, Mantel-Haenszel
6
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“consequence” of another type of error, such as decision
errors. Consider, for instance, a pilot who knowingly
takes off into a forecasted thunderstorm without an
instrument rating. Such a choice would be considered
a decision error within the HFACS framework. Later in
the flight, the pilot may be faced with either turning
around or flying through the weather (flying in instrument meteorological conditions – IMC) when he/she
is authorized for only visual flight rules (VFR) flight.
If the pilot willfully penetrates IMC, a violation would
be committed. This might lead to spatial disorientation
(adverse physiological state), which, in turn, might lead
to a misperception in the aircraft’s attitude (perceptual
error), and ultimately the loss of control of the aircraft
(skill-based error) resulting in an accident. Given such
a scenario, some would argue that the first error in the
chain of events is more important than the skill-based
error committed well down the error chain.
To resolve this potential issue, we examined the seminal unsafe act associated with each accident, the results
of which are presented in Figure 8. As can be seen from
the figure, the pattern of unsafe acts was similar to that
seen in the overall analysis above (see Figure 2). The only
difference is that these percentages will add up to 100%,
since there can only be one “seminal” human causal factor. Still, nearly 61% (n = 8,838) of all accidents began
with a skill-based error. In contrast, roughly 19% (n =
2,729) began with a decision error, 8% (n = 1,180) began
with a violation, and only 4% (n = 564) began with a
perceptual error. The remaining 8% (n = 1,125) were
associated with a seminal event other than an unsafe act
(e.g., a precondition for an unsafe act, such as an adverse
physiological state).

test for homogeneity = 1002.358, p<.001). Put simply,
if a violation of the rules results in an accident, the pilot
is more likely to die or kill someone else than to get up
and walk away.
Question 4: Do the patterns of unsafe acts for fatal
and non-fatal accidents differ across years?
As with the overall analysis, an examination of the
3,256 fatal accidents on a year-by-year basis revealed that
the proportion of accidents associated with at least one
instance of each unsafe act category remained relatively
stable over the 11-year period examined in the study
(Figure 5). As before, there appears to have been a slight
downward trend in both decision errors and violations
during the early part of the 1990s. However, these trends
reversed direction and generally increased during the later
half of the decade.
While this is certainly important information, some
may wonder how these findings compare with the 11,180
non-fatal accidents. As can be seen in Figure 6, the above
results were strikingly similar to those associated with
fatalities. Again, the trends across the years were relatively
flat, and as with fatal accidents, skill-based errors were
associated with more non-fatal accidents than any other
error type, followed by decision errors. The percentage
of non-fatal accidents associated with violations and
perceptual errors were relatively equal across the years.
In fact, the only real difference in the pattern of human
error seen with fatal and non-fatal GA accidents was
with the percentage of accidents attributable, in part, to
violations of the rules (Figure 7).
Question 5: How often is each error type the “primary”
cause of an accident?
The previous analyses have indicated that, overall,
roughly 80% of GA accidents are associated with skillbased errors. More important, however, is how often
skill-based errors are the “initiating” error or simply the

Questions 6 and 7: Do seminal unsafe acts differ
across years or as a function of accident severity (fatal
vs. non-fatal).
Let’s begin with accident severity. As depicted in Figure 9, seminal skill-based errors were associated with the
largest proportion of both fatal and non-fatal accidents.
However, the percentage of non-fatal accidents associated with seminal skill-based errors was somewhat higher
than for fatal accidents. In contrast, seminal violations
continued to be associated with a much larger percentage
of fatal accidents than non-fatal accidents. Percentages
of fatal and non-fatal accidents associated with seminal
decision errors were equivalent, as they were for perceptual
errors. Worth noting, the latter (perceptual errors) were
practically non-existent for both fatal and non-fatal accidents. This finding was not surprising given that most
perceptual errors occur later in the chain of events; after
an individual has committed a violation or following a
decision error.
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Figure 8. Percentage of accidents in which each
unsafe act was the first (seminal) human error in the
accident sequence.
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Figure 9. Percentage of fatal and non-fatal accidents
associated with each seminal error category.
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Where similarities occurred among NTSB causal factors,
the descriptions were grouped according to their similar
nature. This reduced the number of unsafe act exemplars
to a manageable number.
To aid in the presentation of the data, we will examine the fine-grained analysis for each type of unsafe act
separately. Included in the results will be the “top 5” human causal factors overall, across accident severity and
seminal events.
Skill-based errors. The most frequently occurring human error categories within skill-based errors are presented
in Table 1. As can be seen, nearly 12% of all skill-based
errors involved errors in maintaining direction control,
followed by airspeed (10.63%), stall/spin (7.77%), aircraft
control (7.62%), and errors associated with compensating
for wind conditions (6.18%). Together, these five cause
factors accounted for nearly one-half of all the skill-based
errors in the database. For clarification, “directional
control” typically refers to control of the aircraft on the
ground, while “aircraft control” refers to control of the
aircraft in-flight.
The types and frequencies of skill-based errors coded
as fatal/non fatal and seminal events are also shown in
Table 1. As can be seen from this table, the percentage of
skill-based errors involving stall/spin, airspeed, and aircraft
control was greater for fatal than non-fatal accidents.
In fact, causal factors such as directional control and
compensation for wind conditions were rarely associated
with fatal accidents. This pattern was similar whether
one compared fatal and non-fatal accidents, overall, or
only within accidents in which a skill-based error was
the seminal event.
Such findings make sense when one considers that
errors leading to a stall/spin, as well as airspeed and control of the aircraft in the air typically happen at altitude,
making survival less likely. In contrast, errors controlling
the aircraft on the ground (such as ground loops) and
compensation for winds (typically seen during cross-wind
landings), while dangerous, do not necessarily result in
fatalities.
Decision Errors. Table 2 presents the most frequently
occurring decision errors. Improper in-flight planning
tops the list, contributing to roughly 18% of all decision
errors. Errors categorized as in-flight planning refer to
planning or plan revisions performed after the aircraft
has taken off and are often studied as plan continuation
errors (Orasanu, 1993; Burian, Orasanu, & Hitt, 2000;
Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2002; Muthard & Wickens,
2003). The remaining decision errors, such as preflight
planning/decision errors (8.94%), fuel management
(8.73%), poor selection of terrain for takeoff/landing/taxi
(7.85%), and go-around decision (6.03) all occurred at

Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the percentage of fatal
and non-fatal accidents associated with each seminal
error across the 11-year period examined in this study.
In general, the patterns of errors across the years were
virtually the same as those observed for the overall error
trends (see Figures 5 and 6). That is, skill-based errors
were consistently the most frequent cause of both fatal
and non-fatal accidents, followed by decision errors,
violations, and perceptual errors.
What differences did occur between fatal and non-fatal
seminal errors (i.e., skill-based and violations) remained
relatively constant across the years of this study (Figure
12). Furthermore, the differences were in opposite
directions, with a higher percentage of fatal than nonfatal accidents associated with violations and a higher
percentage of non-fatal than fatal accidents associated
with skill-based errors.
Questions 8, 9, and 10: What are the exact types of
errors committed within each error category (question
8) and do these types of errors committed within each
error category differ across accident severity (question
9) or seminal events (question 10)?
Just knowing that skill-based errors (or any other type
of error) are a major concern does not provide safety
professionals sufficient detail to do anything about it.
What is needed is a fine-grained analysis of the specific
types of errors within each HFACS causal category so
that targeted interventions can be developed. With this
in mind, we compared each HFACS classification with
the NTSB’s causal factor designation.
Contained within the NTSB database are three codes
(subject, modifier, and person code) associated with each
cause/factor for a given accident. For instance, an accident
cause may be stated as “VFR flight into IMC” (subject),
“continued” (modifier), “pilot in command” (person
code). Another might be classified as “directional control”
(subject), “not maintained” (modifier), “copilot/second
pilot” (person code).
Because all causal factors identified in this analysis
involved aircrew, we did not need to differentiate the
person code. Of the two remaining codes, the subject
code provided the most information. Although the modifier code provided additional clarity, including it at this
time would have left us with a list of potential human
causal factors well beyond the scope of this study (the
list of subject-modifier combinations far exceeds 500).
Consequently, we restricted our initial analysis to only
the subject codes.
Of note, many of the NTSB subject codes were similar,
with only subtle semantic or behavioral differences among
them (e.g., stall, stall/mush, stall/spin, and tailplane stall).
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Table 1. Five Most Frequent Skill-based Error Categories for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY

Directional Control
Airspeed
Stall/Spin
Aircraft Control
Compensation for winds

Fatal
20 (0.50)
713 (17.9)
592 (14.9)
654 (16.5)
23 (0.6)

OVERALL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
Total
2018 (15.2)
2038 (11.8)
1127 (8.5)
1840 (10.6)
753 (5.7)
1345 (7.8)
665 (5.0)
1319 (7.6)
1046 (6.2)
1069 (6.2)

Fatal
9 (0.57)
302 (19.2)
84 (5.3)
311 (19.8)
12 (0.8

SEMINAL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
Total
1326 (17.5)
1335 (14.6)
605 (8.0)
907 (9.9)
144 (1.9)
228 (2.5)
429 (5.7)
740 (8.1)
859 (11.4)
871 (9.5)

Table 2. Five Most Frequent Decision Error Categories for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY

In-flight Planning
Planning/Decision-making on the Ground
Fuel Management
Unsuitable Terrain Selection
Go Around

Fatal
268 (22.9)
115 (9.8)
40 (3.4)
16 (1.4)
22 (1.9)

OVERALL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
683 (17.0)
349 (8.7)
413 (10.3)
391 (9.8)
291 (7.3)
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Total
951 (18.3)
464 (8.9)
453 (8.7)
407 (7.8)
313 (6.0)

Fatal
133 (22.6)
89 (15.1)
20 (3.4)
5 (.85)
5 (.85)

SEMINAL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
427 (19.8)
284 (13.1)
252 (11.7)
284 (13.1)
70 (3.2)

Total
560 (20.4)
373 (13.6)
272 (9.9)
289 (10.5)
75 (2.7)

Table 3. Five Most Frequent Perceptual Error Categories for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY

Distance
Flare
Altitude
Clearance
Visual/Aural Perception

Fatal
26 (17.8)
5 (3.4)
22 (15.1)
18 (12.3)
15 (9.6)

OVERALL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
233 (27.7)
217 (25.8)
91 (10.8)
51 (6.1)
36 (4.2)

Total
259 (26.4)
222 (22.5)
113 (11.4)
69 (7.0)
50 (5.1)

Fatal
23 (33.8)
4 (5.9)
9 (13.2)
14 (20.6)
3 (4.4)

SEMINAL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
135 (26.5)
163 (32.0)
51 (10.0)
41 (8.1)
5 (1.0)

Total
158 (27.4)
167 (28.9)
60 (10.4)
55 (9.5)
8 (1.4)

Table 4. Five Most Frequent Violations for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY

VFR Flight into IMC
Procedures/Directives Not Followed
Operating Aircraft with Known Deficiencies
Hazardous Maneuver
Flight into Known Adverse Weather

Fatal
305 (25.8)
75 (6.3)
61 (5.2)
154 (13.0)
135 (11.4)

OVERALL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
53 (4.7)
176 (15.6)
168 (14.9)
47 (4.2)
61 (5.4)

Total
358 (15.5)
251 (10.9)
229 (9.9)
201 (8.7)
196 (8.5)

Fatal
182 (30.5)
37 (6.2)
27 (4.5)
83 (13.9)
85 (14.3)

SEMINAL
Frequency (%)
Non-fatal
29 (5.2)
109 (19.6)
97 (17.4)
24 (13.9)
41 (7.4)

Total
211 (25.8)
146 (12.7)
124 (10.8)
107 (9.3)
126 (10.9)

related to performing the flare, which, in most cases, was
associated more with non-fatal than fatal accidents.
Violations. The top five violations are presented in Table
4. Analysis of the fundamental types of unsafe acts that
are included within the violations categories reveals that
the most common violation involved visual flight rules
(VFR) flight into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) (15.5%) and not following known procedures
or directives (10.9%). The remaining top violations included operating aircraft with known deficiencies (9.9%),
performing hazardous maneuvers such as low-altitude
flight or buzzing (8.7%), and flight into adverse weather
(8.5%). Together, these five variables accounted for more
than half of all violations in the database.
The types and frequencies of violations for fatal/nonfatal and seminal events are also presented in Table 4. As
indicated, the categories VFR flight into IMC, hazardous
maneuver, and flight into known adverse weather were
much more likely to be fatal than non-fatal, both overall
and for seminal events only. This pattern is consistent
with the observation that accidents involving violations
of the rules are, in general, more likely to be fatal.

approximately the same frequencies. Combined, these
five causal categories accounted for roughly half (49.89%)
of all decision errors in the database. It should be noted
that individual factors related to weather-related decision
making did not reach the top of the list (e.g., weather
evaluation, flight into adverse weather, and inadvertent
VFR flight into IMC). However, when combined, they
did constitute a significant portion of the factors related
to decision- making (6%).
Table 2 also presents the types and frequencies of
decision errors for fatal/non fatal and seminal events.
As indicated, the categories in-flight planning and planning/decision making on the ground tended to be associated
more often with fatal than non-fatal accidents. Whereas
the categories unsuitable terrain, go around, and fuel
management were associated more often with non-fatal
accidents. This pattern was generally consistent for the
overall data, as well as within seminal events.
Perceptual errors. A review of accident causes and factors coded as perceptual errors revealed that misjudging
distance was the most common, accounting for over a
quarter of all perceptual errors (26.4%; see Table 3). The
next highest was flare (22.5%), followed by misperceiving altitude (11.4%), misjudging clearance (7.0%) and
visual/aural perception (5.1%). Together, these errors
accounted for nearly three-quarters of all perceptual errors in the database.
The types and frequencies of perceptual errors as they
occurred within fatal/non-fatal accidents are also shown
in Table 3. As can be seen from this table, there is very
little difference in the percentage of fatal and non-fatal
accidents associated with any particular type of perceptual
error. The only exception appears to be perceptual errors

DISCUSSION
The present study of GA accidents examined literally
thousands of unsafe acts committed by pilots, perhaps
suggesting that, correspondingly, there are literally thousands of unique ways to crash an airplane. The results
of this study, however, demonstrate that accidents that
may appear to be unique can be reliably grouped, based
upon underlying cognitive mechanisms of pilot errors. By
applying HFACS, a theoretically based model of human
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recency of experience is less. Herein lies the rub. According to models by Reason (1990) and Rasmussen (1982),
skill-based errors, by definition, occur during the execution of routine events. Furthermore, once a particular
skill is developed, it must be maintained through repetition and experience. Given that many GA pilots fly less
and typically participate in less recurrent training than
commercial and military pilots, it stands to reason that
their proficiency would be degraded. In turn, this lack of
proficiency may explain the increase in skill-based errors
evident in the accident data.
Indeed, one can imagine a situation where increased
workload in-flight (e.g., while flying in IMC or adverse
weather) quickly overcomes an inexperienced pilot and
diminishes the capacity to monitor altitude, fuel state,
visual clearances, communication, or directional control.
Furthermore, the inattention that results from a high
workload situation could manifest as failing to monitor
critical flight instruments, the failure to accomplish required in-flight checklist items, or the gradual, inadvertent
loss of airspeed, all of which would appear in the present
study as skill-based errors.
The real question is, “How do you go about reducing
skill-based errors?” Perhaps the obvious answer is through
experience and effective training. In that way, pilots are
able to increase their familiarity with the rules governing
flight and increase their knowledge of all aspects of their
domain, improve their overall proficiency, and become
less prone to attention slips or memory lapses due to
high workload or distractions. However, that may not
be the only answer. Other proposed ways to manage
pilot workload include detailed checklists (Degani &
Wiener, 1993), automation such as auditory reminders
of critical tasks (Norman, 1988), and task or workload
management training (Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich,
1993). Whether these or any other interventions can be
effectively integrated into the GA environment remains
to be determined.

error, we were able to highlight several human error trends
and identify the categories of unsafe acts that contribute
to both fatal and non-fatal GA accidents.
While there are many ways to describe the accident
data, perhaps the best way is to discuss the findings in
the order of their relative contributions to the accidents
examined, beginning with skill-based errors.
Skill-Based Errors
By far, skill-based errors were the most common type
of error in the accident database as nearly 80% of all GA
accidents were associated with at least one skill-based
error. Of these, roughly half were the first human causal
factor in the chain of events.
The most common skill-based errors among more
than 17,000 identified in this study included: control
or handling of the aircraft on the ground and in the air,
improperly maintaining airspeed, the occurrence of a
stall or spin, and compensating for wind. Notably, these
skill-based errors occurred more often than any other
error category across all types of unsafe acts – not just
the skill-based error category.
These findings are not without precedent in aviation.
In fact, our previous work has shown that skill-based
errors are the most prevalent form of aircrew error in
commercial and military aviation accidents as well
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell,
1999; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a, 2001b). Still, the
percentages reported here were generally higher than
those found in our other investigations, suggesting that
skill-based errors are even more prevalent in GA than in
other domains.
So, what caused these skill-based errors in the first
place? Historically, these types of errors are often attributed to failures of the pilot to monitor crucial flight
parameters, a fundamental aspect of cockpit task management (Funk, 1991). For instance, if interrupted or
distracted by a situation or event, a pilot can quickly
become sidetracked from the primary task of flying the
airplane. Furthermore, individuals are more susceptible to
distraction during low processing tasks. Ultimately, these
intrusions, uncertainties, and general distractions may
keep the pilot from effectively monitoring the aircraft’s
airspeed and altitude as well as other parameters critical
to the flight. As a result, a skill-based error is committed
that may lead to an incident/accident.
Another possibility is that the lower levels of experience and training obtained by GA pilots may account for
the larger proportion of accidents involving skill-based
errors than those observed in military and commercial
aviation. Presumably, GA pilots fly less frequently than
their military or commercial counterparts do, such that

Violations
Violations are the classic glass half-empty, glass
half-full conundrum. On the one hand, GA accidents
associated with at least one violation were present in
“only” 14% of the data (i.e., glass half-full). On the
other hand, GA accidents associated with violations
were second only to skill-based errors when fatalities
were involved (glass half-empty). The latter is of more
concern to the FAA.
As stated previously, this finding indicates that if a
pilot breaks a rule that results in an accident, he or she
is much more likely to perish than if the accident was
due to some other (non-rule breaking) action. These
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As a result, other interventions have been proposed to
reduce the occurrence of violations, such as the education
of GA pilots on the extent of the real risks of violating established rules and regulations. Another proposal involves
simulator training of difficult tasks such as emergencies
or risky situations to directly demonstrate the hazards
associated with violating rules (Knecht et al., 2003).
While many cases of flight into adverse weather are
rightfully coded as violations, there are many that may
not represent a willful departure from established procedures and are instead the result of the misdiagnosis of
weather conditions, improper planning, or a decision not
to use preflight briefing service information. Rather than
coding them as willful violations, these errors represent
a breakdown in the decision-making process and are
thus captured within the next category to be addressed
— decision errors.

results are similar to those observed in the military and
commercial aviation domains (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001a, 2001b).
Many of the violations cited in the database involved
weather-related factors, including VFR flight into IMC.
The question remains, however, as to why a pilot would
willfully fly into such dangerous weather conditions. Goh
and Wiegmann (2002), along with O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) found that social pressures often contribute
to continued flight into adverse weather. For example,
Goh and Wiegmann reported that GA accidents resulting from VFR flight into IMC were more likely to have
passengers on board than any other type of accident.
Furthermore, in a study of weather-related decision-making, Holbrook, Orasanu, and McCoy (2003) found that
“systemic pressures” to fly, such as those from passengers
or other pilots, may “contribute to pilots’ decisions to
continue flight despite cues suggesting they should do
otherwise” (p. 581). Further analysis is needed, however,
to determine the extent to which these factors contribute
to accidents within the present database.
Beyond social pressures previously addressed, O’Hare
and his colleagues (O’Hare & Owen, 1999; O’Hare &
Smitheram, 1995) have explored this question by investigating how pilots frame the situation of continuing or
discontinuing flight into adverse weather. They found
that pilots who framed diverting from a flight plan as a
loss (e.g., loss of time, economic loss, or expense of effort)
tend to continue flight into adverse weather; whereas
those who frame a diverting decision as a gain (e.g., in
personal safety) tend to divert more.
Some research (i.e., O’Hare, 1990; Goh & Wiegmann,
2002) suggests that pilot overconfidence and a limited
appreciation of the risks involved with flight into adverse
weather may also contribute to weather-related violations.
Others contend that there are GA pilots who “simply
do not mind taking risks and yet who also either lack
the experience to assess those risks, or perhaps have just
enough experience to overestimate their own abilities”
(Knecht, Harris, & Shappell, 2003; p.673).
While the percentage of accidents involving violations
shows no appreciable decline over the years studied, the
simplest way to reduce the occurrence of violations is
through continually and consistently enforcing the rules.
Unfortunately, simply enforcing rules more effectively is
extremely difficult within GA due to its organizational
structure. Since it is often not clear exactly whose authority
GA pilots fly under (as compared with military and
commercial pilots), it becomes very difficult to police
the GA system.

Decision Errors
Decision errors were present in roughly one-third of
all accidents, which is also consistent with proportions
observed within other aviation domains (O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994; Murray, 1997; Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a,
2001b). These percentages were roughly equivalent for
both fatal and non-fatal accidents, even when only seminal
decision errors were examined.
Upon closer examination, it appears that many of the
decision errors involved planning, both in-flight and on
the ground, as well as issues related to weather evaluation. Recently, Burian, Orasanu, and Hitt (2000) found
that 28% of accidents involving weather events involved
plan continuation errors, and suggest that pilots with less
experience may “not trust what their eyes are telling them
and so proceed on blindly” (p. 25). Wiegmann, Goh,
and O’Hare (2002) also studied the occurrence of plan
continuation errors of VFR flight into IMC and presented
findings that suggest that under certain conditions these
errors are more often attributable to poor situation assessment (early stages of information processing) than to
motivational judgment. In either case, however, proper
planning, both in the air and on the ground, is a critical
component of flight safety.
Proposals for ways of improving pilots’ judgment
often involve training in aeronautical decision-making.
It is generally believed that novices may lack a full understanding of the significance of some weather-related
cues. Therefore, by examining techniques used by expert
pilots to assess situations and solve problems, a better
training method may be developed. For example, Wiggins
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and O’Hare (2003) recently developed a program for
the FAA that uses static weather images and short video
clips to help teach pilots how to more effectively identify
critical weather cues. Based on initial evaluations, the
computer-based training program shows positive effects
on aeronautical decision-making.
Another method of assisting pilot decision-making
is the implementation of planning aids. Layton, Smith,
and McCoy (1994) evaluated the effectiveness of three
different planning aid (cooperative) systems and demonstrated that different system design concepts can
strongly influence the cognitive processes and resultant
performance. Through their findings, the researchers
recommended further research into better information
displays, geographical interfaces of alternative route manipulation, access to more complete and accurate weather
and traffic information, and optimization technologies
to assist users in generating alternative plans. Others
have encouraged further study of the improved design
of displays that present critical data such as weather,
traffic, and other environmental information (Wickens
& Hollands, 2000).
Finally, scenario-based training has been shown to be
an effective technique for improving decision-making
in a variety of domains. The training method involves
embedding decision-making tasks within a “real world”
context, similar to those in an operational setting. This
is in contrast to traditional training methods that compartmentalize or modularize training, teaching decision
strategies in isolation or independently from a particular
context. Indeed, the FAA’s General Aviation & Commercial Division (AFS-800) has recently introduced the
FAA/Industry Training Standards (FITS) program aimed
at improving GA flight training using scenario-based
training and other technologies. While the program is
currently focusing on “personal or professionally flown
single-pilot aircraft for transportation with new technologies” (Glista, 2003), there is no reason to believe that
FITS will not benefit the light-sport and recreational
pilots as well.

Furthermore, due to the relatively small numbers of
perceptual errors coded within the GA accidents studied,
it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Nevertheless, it is
reasonably clear that errors involving misjudging information comprise the majority of perceptual errors and
represent misperception, as opposed to non-detection.
Analogous to other errors made in the presence of correct and adequate information, misperception errors are
disheartening, as pilots inaccurately code or improperly
process accurate cues from the environment. Ultimately,
this leads to the misjudging of altitude, distance, or
descent, which encompass a large proportion of the
perceptual errors cited within the present database.
That being said, one may wonder why spatial disorientation did not make the top 5 of the perceptual error
list. Spatial disorientation, although often leading to
perceptual errors (e.g., misjudging altitude/attitude),
is not considered an error. Rather, it is considered a
physiological state that cannot be controlled by the
individual. That is, you are either disoriented or you are
not and more important, not every instance of spatial
disorientation leads to a perceptual error (e.g., Type 1
– recognized spatial disorientation, otherwise referred
to as the “leans”).
Consequently, our SMEs classified instances of spatial
disorientation within the HFACS category of adverse physiological states. Unfortunately, when NTSB investigators
did identify spatial disorientation (an adverse physiological
state using HFACS) they often did not identify the resultant perceptual error when reporting the causes/factors
associated with an accident. Hence, perceptual errors
were under-reported here. For completeness, there were
279 accidents out of the 14,436 we examined (1.9%)
associated with spatial disorientation, of which all but
34 involved fatalities.
Perceptual errors, whether caused by spatial disorientation or other factors, are much like skill-based errors
and can degrade due to lack of recency, experience, or
training. However, in addition to training and practice,
other interventions such as enhanced displays may improve
the veridical nature of pilots’ perceptions. For example,
such technologies as radar altimeters, angle-of-attack
indicators, or other such displays may ultimately reduce
accidents due to perceptual errors.

Perceptual Errors
Not surprisingly, perceptual errors contribute to
the smallest percentage of accidents within the present
analysis (5.7%), a percentage that is much lower than
that found in military research (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2003). Given the non-tactical, non-aerobatic nature of
GA flight, spatial disorientation and difficulties in perception are expected to occur at a lower frequency than
is found within military aviation, particularly within the
dynamic domains of fighter, tactical, aerobatic, or night
operating aircraft.

Additional Issues
As previously described, the present study examined
only those causes or contributing factors that were classified as unsafe acts by the aircrew. There are a number
of other accident cause factors that involve humans that
are not unsafe acts. For instance, in addition to spatial
disorientation, a breakdown in communication is another
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example of a human error that is not considered an unsafe
act within HFACS. Rather, the category of crew resource
management (CRM) captures errors of communication
between pilots and their crew, other pilots, and air traffic controllers, and is classified under the “preconditions
for unsafe acts” within HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann,
2000, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Many other potentially important human factors related accident causes are also captured within other levels
of analysis such as fatigue, alcohol use, self medication
(use of over-the-counter medications), workload, medical
history, and work environment. While important human
factors, these are also not considered to be unsafe acts and
were not examined within the present study.
Nevertheless, such causal factors were rarely cited in
the NTSB database. In fact, analysis of all seminal events
indicated that less than 8% of all seminal cause factors
were anything other than an unsafe act by the aircrew.
So, although we can all agree that such factors as spatial
disorientation, self-medication, and poor CRM are
important issues (and HFACS does account for these as
preconditions), they were virtually non-existent in the
general aviation database.
Such limited information concerning pre-conditions
for unsafe acts does result in only a partial picture of the
entire sequence of events that contributed to the accident.
However, the present study represents the most comprehensive human error analysis of GA data ever conducted
and provides useful information for understanding the
immediate causes of accidents. Furthermore, the absence
of critical preconditions in the database clearly indicates
a need to improve the accident investigation process so
that more in-depth information concerning the causes of
aircrew error can be identified. Indeed, HFACS provides
an effective tool for improving this process (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2003).

Historically, accident and incident interventions have
been generated by the NTSB in the form of recommendations or have come from experts in the government
(FAA, NASA, etc.), military, or other aviation organizations. As a result, they tend to focus on the prevention of
specific types of accidents such as those related to loss of
control in flight or controlled flight into terrain, rather
than specific types of human error per se. What’s more,
the interventions tend to be rather narrow in scope, often emphasizing only changes to the aircraft in the form
of automation and displays or simply recommending
changes to existing policies or regulations. Even when
attempts are made to address specific types of human
error, the emphasis has traditionally been placed on pilot
decision-making, which accounts for just over 30% of
the GA accidents that occur annually.
What is needed is a systematic approach to generating
intervention/prevention strategies that can tie into the
HFACS framework that has proven success with civilian
aviation accident and incident data. Within epidemiology,
one such approach, the Haddon matrix, was developed
to address injuries sustained as the result of automobile
accidents (Haddon, 1980). Haddon’s argument was that
we often overlook potentially useful interventions by not
considering all aspects of the accident/incident. In fact,
when one examines the typical interventions recommended by the NTSB and others following an accident,
they typically focus on only a few areas rather than the
gamut of intervention possibilities.
Along these lines, Wiegmann and Rantanen (2002)
examined over 75 intervention strategies identified by
NASA for use within U.S. civilian aviation using a similar
matrix. In that study, the vast majority of the interventions were technologically oriented, leaving one to believe
that a variety of other potentially useful strategies had
been left on the drawing board or not even considered.
Ideally, a similar matrix using HFACS causal categories
could be developed that would be both manageable and
effective at generating putative intervention strategies and
assessing their impact prior to deployment.
It is apparent from the current study that human error
associated with GA accidents is multi-faceted. Specifically,
our analyses have revealed that the largest percentage of
accidents is associated with skill-based errors, followed
by decision errors, violations of the rules and regulations,
and perceptual errors. While individual interventions
may address one error form more than another, a true
intervention “strategy” will identify a variety of interventions targeted at all four error forms. The next step in
this research effort will be the development of the Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) that pits the

CONCLUSIONS
The high level of safety currently achieved within
aviation should not obscure the fact that many aviation
accidents are preventable. It is important to realize that
safety measures and defenses currently in place in GA
may be inadequate, circumvented, or perhaps ignored,
and that the intervention strategies aimed at reducing the
occurrence or consequences of human error may not be
as effective as possible.
Even though the results of the present study point
to several ways to reduce the rate of GA fatalities, there
may be several more and far better solutions that have
yet to be identified.
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unsafe acts of operators (i.e., skill-based errors, decision
errors, perceptual errors, and violations) against several
putative intervention approaches (e.g., organizational,
human-centered, technology, task, and environment;
Figure 13). In addition, other features will be integrated
into the model/matrix such as feasibility, efficacy, and
acceptance.

Organizational/
Administrative

Human/
Crew

Technology/
Engineering

Task/
Mission
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